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Background: Resource-limited tropical countries are home to numerous infectious pathogens of both human and
zoonotic origin. A capability for early detection to allow rapid outbreak containment and prevent spread to non-
endemic regions is severely impaired by inadequate diagnostic laboratory capacity, the absence of a “cold chain”
and the lack of highly trained personnel. Building up detection capacity in these countries by direct replication of
the systems existing in developed countries is not a feasible approach and instead requires “leapfrogging” to the
deployment of the newest diagnostic systems that do not have the infrastructure requirements of systems used in
developed countries.
Methods: A laboratory for molecular diagnostics of infectious agents was established in Bo, Sierra Leone with a
hybrid solar/diesel/battery system to ensure stable power supply and a satellite modem to enable efficient
communication. An array of room temperature stabilization and refrigeration technologies for reliable transport and
storage of reagents and biological samples were also tested to ensure sustainable laboratory supplies for diagnostic
assays.
Results: The laboratory demonstrated its operational proficiency by conducting an investigation of a suspected
avian influenza outbreak at a commercial poultry farm at Bo using broad range resequencing microarrays and real
time RT-PCR. The results of the investigation excluded influenza viruses as a possible cause of the outbreak and
indicated a link between the outbreak and the presence of Klebsiella pneumoniae.
Conclusions: This study demonstrated that by application of a carefully selected set of technologies and sufficient
personnel training, it is feasible to deploy and effectively use a broad-range infectious pathogen detection
technology in a severely resource-limited setting.Background
Developing countries in tropical regions of the world are
the home for numerous important infectious pathogens
[1-3]. Many of these infectious agents may have their
reservoirs in domesticated or wild animals [4-8]. Since
inhabitants of these countries live in relatively closer
contact with animals, than populations of highly* Correspondence: tomasz.leski@nrl.navy.mil
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reproduction in any medium, provided the ordeveloped countries, the chance of transmission of zoo-
notic infections to humans is much greater [9]. Some of
these pathogens not only have severe impact on public
health in countries where they are endemic, but may
also be rapidly disseminated to non-endemic regions
through global transportation networks (air, freight con-
tainers), migratory birds, and expanding wildlife trade
[10-15]. While outbreaks caused by highly lethal patho-
gens such as Ebola, Nipah or H5N1 influenza viruses are
usually followed by high profile epidemiologic investiga-
tions, the everyday infectious disease diagnostics and
epidemiological surveillance systems in many of thesed. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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one of the prime examples [16,17]. This situation is
compounded by serious shortages of resources and
trained personnel capable of performing diagnostic pro-
cedures. As a consequence, infectious disease outbreaks
in these settings are detected relatively late in their
course. A typical example of the problem was the recent
yellow fever outbreak that began in October 2010 in
Uganda. The outbreak, initially suspected to be caused
by Ebola virus, started in early October and was subse-
quently misdiagnosed as amoebic dysentery, alcohol poi-
soning, and plague before being correctly identified as
yellow fever at the end of December. By the time of con-
firmation, there were approximately 200 confirmed cases
and nearly 50 deaths were recorded [18,19].
Rapid and efficient infectious disease surveillance sys-
tems are necessary to improve outbreak management
and mitigate the consequences of outbreaks. However,
direct replication the infectious outbreak surveillance
systems in their current form that exist in developed
countries is not practical due to many reasons including
absence of detailed maps and lack of basic laboratory in-
frastructure needed to support traditional diagnostic sys-
tems. Our previous work on participatory mapping and
surveying methods has indicated promising solutions to
the first problem [20]. The issues related to inefficiency
of current infectious disease diagnostics based on culture
and simple molecular assays remain a serious challenge.
Microbial culture, while still a “gold standard” technique
for identification of bacteria, cannot be applied for de-
tection of viral pathogens. In addition, microbial culture
is labor intensive, time consuming and requires qualified
and experienced technicians which are frequently in
short supply in these locations. Molecular assays are
rapid and sensitive but due to their low level of multi-
plexing usually a number of different molecular assays
needs to be performed sequentially to achieve definitive
diagnosis. This is especially relevant in cases of infec-
tious syndromes of diverse etiologies but manifested by
similar symptoms [21]. Reliance on these technologies
results in significant delays between specimen isolation
and pathogen identification. An additional difficulty
experienced by many regions of the developing world is
the lack of a reliable cold chain capability necessary for
transport and preservation of biological samples and
diagnostic reagents in hot climate due to unreliable
power and a lack of basic refrigeration equipment.
One of the ways to significantly improve the microbial
diagnostic capacity in developing countries may be ‘leap-
frogging’ or skipping some stages of technological devel-
opment that other countries have passed or are passing
through [22,23]. A good example of the “leapfrog”
phenomenon is the use of mobile phone technology,
which has enabled the communication in villages indeveloping countries that have never had land phones
with their associated expensive infrastructure [24]. In case
of microbial diagnostics, developing countries may need
to jump directly to broad-range microbial diagnostic sys-
tems, which are capable of one-step detection and identifi-
cation of large number of diverse pathogens in a single,
highly automated, assay. Advanced broad-range diagnostic
technologies have the potential of making the pathogen
identification process simpler and faster leading to more
efficient detection and management of infectious disease
outbreaks both in humans and animals.
The purpose of this study was to test the feasibility of
application of a broad-spectrum diagnostics/surveillance
platform for microbial detection in a resource-limited
setting. This feasibility study was the result of a collab-
orative effort between the US Naval Research Laboratory
and Njala University, which led to the establishment of a
molecular diagnostic laboratory at Mercy Hospital Re-
search Laboratory, Bo, Sierra Leone.
Setting up this type of facility required solving a num-
ber of issues typical for developing countries with a trop-
ical climate including securing a reliable power supply,
implementing cold chain and complementary methods
of preserving biological samples and reagents, and enab-
ling efficient communication by setting up an internet
linked computer network. This paper describes how a
broad spectrum diagnostics system was successfully
deployed using a set of “leapfrog” technologies that were
found to be critical in establishing an efficient labora-
tory. The resequencing-microarray-based diagnostic sys-
tem was subsequently applied for investigation of a
suspected avian influenza outbreak at the commercial
poultry farm.
Methods
Laboratory setup
The molecular diagnostic laboratory was set up in
Mercy Hospital Research Laboratory (MHRL) located in
the city of Bo, Sierra Leone. Bo is the second largest city
in Sierra Leone and the capital of the Southern Prov-
ince. The 1,200 square foot laboratory was located on
the Mercy Hospital campus in Kulanda Town section of
Bo. All equipment, which required temperature within
certain limits for proper operation (including PCR
instruments, Affymetrix fluidics stations, hybridization
ovens and microarray scanner) was located in two air-
conditioned rooms. An additional air-conditioned
laboratory area detached from the main laboratory
building was equipped with a PCR laminar flow hood
and used for sample preparation for PCR, RT-PCR and
sample processing for resequencing pathogen micro-
array (RPM) assays.
For cold storage, the laboratory was equipped with two
57 liter AcuTemp AX56L/HemaCool mobile refrigerator/
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60 liter portable vaccine refrigeration units (two freezers
and two refrigerators) with ability to be powered with 12/
24-volt DC or 110/240-volt AC (Fridge-Freeze Inc. San
Diego, CA) and one upright Kenmore freezer model 2804
(Sears, Roebuck and Co., Hoffman Estates, IL). HemaCool
freezers can be adjusted for freezing (−20°C) or refriger-
ation (+4°C) and can be run for 16 hrs continuously in the
absence of external power on internal batteries.
The power for the laboratory operation was supplied
by two hybrid power subsystems, one operating at
230 V, 50 Hz (used for powering European and African
made equipment) and another one operating at 120 V,
60 Hz (for powering US made scientific instruments).
Both systems relied on combination of solar power with
battery storage and diesel generator backup. The 230 V
subsystem was additionally connected to municipal
power grid and used municipal power when available.
The detailed description of the power system and its
performance was published previously [25,26].
Communication
A stand-alone solar powered C-band satellite communi-
cation system was configured by Satcom Resources
(Avon, CO) and deployed at MHRL. Bandwidth (512/
128 (kb/s) up/down) was provided by Constellation Net-
works Corp. (Traverse City, MI) and served up to 20
users simultaneously via intranet across the Mercy Hos-
pital campus. The diagram of the network configuration
is included in supplementary data (Additional file 1:
Figure S4). Teleconferencing for training purposes and
data exchange was conducted using Skype platform (Skype
Technologies S.A., Rives de Clausen, Luxembourg).
Ambient temperature stable reagents
Ambient temperature stabilized reagents for PCR, real-
time PCR or resequencing microarray protocols were ei-
ther obtained commercially or developed in-house using
lyophilization techniques (see Additional file 2: Tables
S3 and S4 for listing of stabilized reagents tested and
used for all molecular diagnostics protocols).
FTA paper - sample stabilization and recovery
Flinders Technology Associates filter paper (FTA paper,
Whatman/GE Healthcare, Florham Park, NJ) [27] was
used in this work to explore its suitability for dry storage
of RNA preparations and for stabilization of field sam-
ples collected from poultry. Either Indicating FTA Mini
Cards (WB120356, Whatman) or Indicating FTA Classic
Cards (WB120206, Whatman) were used depending on
the application. An aliquot of RNA samples was spotted
on the card or swabs containing field samples were
pressed against an FTA card in order to transfer the
maximum amount of fluid from swab to the FTA paper.Subsequently the FTA cards were air dried at ambient
temperatures for 40 minutes. Dry FTA cards were stored
at ambient temperatures unless otherwise indicated.
To recover the nucleic acids for use in diagnostic pro-
cedures, the FTA paper embedded samples were pro-
cessed using the following procedure modified from a
protocol developed by Rogers and Burgoyne [28]. Circu-
lar punches (1 mm or 3 mm in diameter) of the FTA
paper from the areas of sample deposition were taken
using Harris Uni-Core punch (Ted Pella Inc., Redding,
CA). The punches were placed into 0.5 mL microcentri-
fuge tubes and incubated for 5 min. with gentle shaking
in 200 μl of solution A (4 M LiCl solution in 50% etha-
nol). The incubation was repeated once with fresh solu-
tion A. After incubation, the disks were washed with
gentle shaking for 5 min. in 200 μl of solution B (50 mM
Tris–HCl solution in isopropanol), then washed twice
for 5 min. with 200 μl of 70% ethanol. After the final
wash, the samples were air dried at 42°C for at least
30 minutes to remove the traces of ethanol completely.
RNA purification
The RNA was purified from influenza B/Lee/40 prepara-
tions (Advanced Biotechnologies, Inc., Columbia, MD)
using MasterPure DNA and RNA purification kit (Epi-
centre Biotechnologies, Madison, WI) using manufac-
turer recommended protocol.
Testing viral RNA stabilization efficiency on FTA paper
Influenza B RNA samples (5 μl each of 106, 104 or 102
genome copies/μl dilutions) were spotted on Indicating
FTA Mini Cards (Whatman). The cards were incubated
under one of three conditions: at room temperature 20-
25°C (on a laboratory bench), 30°C (incubator) and 30-
45°C (outdoors, protected from light) for up to 10 days.
Three 1 mm punches were removed from the FTA cards
at 24 hours, 3 days, and 10 days). The punches were
processed as described above (see “FTA paper - sample
stabilization and recovery” section).
Collection of poultry pharyngeal samples
Pharyngeal swabs were collected on March 30th, 2009,
using sterile techniques from 136 chickens housed in 9
different poultry farms. The farms were located in Bo
and in the vicinity of Freetown (Figure 1), their geo-
graphic coordinates were determined using handheld
Garmin GPSMAP 60CSx GPS unit (Garmin Inter-
national Inc., Olathe, KS). Basic farm information, the
numbers of samples taken at each farm and general
health characteristics of the poultry on farms sampled
are included in Table 1. The collected swab samples
were stabilized and stored on FTA cards. After trans-
porting to the laboratory in ambient temperatures, the
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Figure 1 Locations of farms in Sierra Leone where poultry samples were collected.
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for long term storage.
Resequencing microarrays
The resequencing microarray analysis was conducted
using RPM-Flu v. 3.1 (RPM-Flu) and RPM-TEI v. 1.0
microarrays (RPM-TEI) in March 2010. Poultry samples
for analysis were selected using a two-stage process. First
the samples for which the amount of deposited samples
was small (judged by the size of spot with change of
color on indicating FTA card) were rejected. The
remaining FTA samples were blindly drawn to select 15
samples from Bo farm and 3 samples each from 5 other
farms. RPM-Flu v. 3.1 was designed to detect all known
subtypes of influenza A viruses and 84 other viral and
bacterial respiratory pathogens [29], while the RPM-TEI
microarray was designed for detection of a broad range
of biothreat agents [30] some of them (such as Lassa
virus) endemic to West Africa. Sample processing was
conducted as previously described [30-32] with thefollowing modifications related to the use of FTA paper
embedded samples. Briefly, reverse transcription using
random primers was used to obtain cDNA from RNA
templates potentially present in a processed FTA paper
disk for each analyzed sample. The resulting mixture
was separated from the FTA paper disk and split into
four aliquots of equal volume for multiplex PCR reac-
tions using either RPM-Flu or RPM-TEI microarray spe-
cific primer cocktails. Modified version of this protocol
for testing the lyophilized/ambient temperature stabi-
lized reagents is included as Supplementary Data.
Pathogen identification was performed using previously
developed Computer-Implemented Biological Sequence
Identifier (CIBSI) 2.0 software [33]. Although the microar-
rays are designed with tiles for specific pathogen targets
[29,30,32], they are capable of detection and correct se-
quence determination of targets differing by up to 15%
from the sequence present on the microarray. This allows
for detection of target variants and near-neighbor
discrimination.
Table 1 Farm and chicken sample information
No. Farm location No.
of
sheds
No. of
samples
collected
Sample
designations
Condition of chickens
Town Coordinates
1 Bo 7°57.911'N 11°44.767'W 1 40 B1-B40 Outbreak affecting 15% of chickens
2 Hamilton 8°23.275'N 13°15.453'W 4 20 H1-H20 All healthy
3 Oogu 8°24.256'N 13°15.612'W 1 16 O1-O16 All healthy
4 Wellington 8°27.222'N 13°10.242'W 3 12 W1-12 Some chickens sick
5 Allen Town 8°24.266'N 13°8.742'W 11 16 A1-16 All healthy
6 Hastings 8°22.776'N 13°8.094'W 1 8 HA1-HA8 All healthy
7 Hastings 8°22.622'N 13°7.997'W 1 4 HB1-HB4 All healthy
8 Hastings 8°22.403'N 13°7.925'W 2 8 HC1-HC8 All healthy
9 Joe Town 8°19.549'N 13°2.535'W 3 12 J1-12 Some chickens sick
Table 2 Technologies applied to deploy broad-range
infectious pathogen diagnostics
Problem Solution/s applied
Unreliable power Efficient hybrid solar/diesel power system
Lack of “cold chain” On-site refrigeration
FTA paper for sample collection,
transport and storage
Ambient temperature stabilized reagent sets
Delivery of regular reagents on dry-ice
Lack of efficient
communication
Wired/wireless, hi-speed campus
network connected
with Internet via satellite
Inadequate personnel
expertise
Hands-on training in reference laboratory (NRL)
and on-site.
Remote technical support by email
and Skype videoconferencing.
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In order to detect influenza B RNA in testing RNA
stabilization on FTA 1 mm processed disks were placed in
a 0.5 mL PCR tube, and subjected to one step reverse
transcription and PCR (RT-PCR) using Qiagen OneStep
RT-PCR Kit (Qiagen, Valencia, CA) according to the man-
ufacturer’s instructions. Positive controls were prepared
using liquid preparations of influenza B RNA stored at
−20°C. The RT-PCR reaction was run in 25 μl total vol-
ume using previously published BMA-F1 and BMA-R1
primers for detection of influenza B [31] and the following
thermal cycling protocol: 50°C for 30 min; 95°C for
15 min.; 40 cycles of 94°C for 30 sec., 54°C 30 sec., 72°C
30 sec.; 72°C 10 min. The expected amplicon was a 162 bp
segment of the influenza B matrix gene. The amplification
results were analyzed using 2% TAE agarose gels contain-
ing ethidium bromide. The bands were visualized in UV
light and images captured using UVP BioDoc-It System,
model M-20 (UVP, Upland, CA).
Real-time RT-PCR for universal detection of influenza
A (based on detection of fragment of the Matrix gene)
was performed using previously published PCR primers:
MatrixF1 and MatrixR1 [34]. A preparation of influenza
A H3N2 control strain was used as a positive control,
water and blank processed FTA paper discs were used as
negative controls. Reverse transcription (RT) was per-
formed using AccuPower Cyclescript RT premix (Bio-
neer, Alameda, CA). The total volume of the RT
reaction was 20 μl containing 500 nM each of forward
and reverse primers. The reaction mixture was subjected
to 12 cycles of incubation at 25°C for 1 min. and 50°C
for 4 min. and single final incubation at 95°C for 5 min.
The real-time PCR amplification reactions were con-
ducted using SsoFast EvaGreen reaction mix (Bio-Rad
Laboratories, Hercules, CA) according to the manufac-
turer’s instructions. The reaction was carried out in
20 μl total volume containing 500 nM of each primer
with 2 μl of the RT reaction mixture as a template. Thethermal cycling and fluorescent signal detection was per-
formed in a CFX96 real-time PCR detection system
(Bio-Rad Laboratories) with the following thermal cyc-
ling conditions: initial incubation at 98°C for 2 min. fol-
lowed by 40 cycles of 98°C for 2 sec. and 60°C for 5 sec.
The amplification cycle was followed by melting curve
analysis. The results were analyzed with CFX Manager
software ver. 1.5.534.0511 (Bio-Rad Laboratories).
The protocols for RT-PCR and real-time RT-PCR for
detection of influenza A using ambient temperature sta-
bilized reagents are described in Supplementary Data
(Additional file 2), and the reagents used with these pro-
tocols are listed in (Additional file 2): Tables S3 and S4.
Results and discussion
Laboratory operation
This study was intended to identify the suite of technolo-
gies necessary to deploy and successfully apply an
advanced, “leapfrogging”, technology for broad range
pathogen identification in a severely resource-limited
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boratory in a developing country are listed in Table 2.
They needed to be addressed in order to make the labora-
tory operational and capable of reliably running high qual-
ity molecular diagnostic protocols. While the general class
of solutions was easy to recognize, the actual solution
implemented depended intimately on the local conditions.
Stable power
One of the most significant difficulties in establishing
stable operation of the molecular diagnostics laboratory in
Bo was inadequate power necessary to run laboratory
equipment. Due to the reliance on hydroelectric power
generation in Sierra Leone, the availability of municipal
electricity (supplied by Bo/Kenema Power Service –
BKPS) varies throughout the year and power is mostly un-
available during the dry season spanning from November
to April. Even when available, the electricity is of poor
quality due to inadequate design of electrical grid and is
not suitable for powering sensitive scientific equipment
[26]. To overcome this problem an innovative hybrid
power system composed two self-contained local grids
with two hybrid power subsystems (230 V, 50 Hz and
120 V, 60 Hz) was designed and deployed [25,26]. The sys-
tem combined solar power generation with battery storage
and diesel generator backup to provide reliable power for
both basic laboratory infrastructure (e.g. lights, air condi-
tioners) as well as sensitive scientific instruments (e.g.
PCR cyclers, GenChip scanner).
Personnel training
Training is another key component of a successful la-
boratory set up. The laboratory personnel have under-
gone 10-week training in basic molecular biology
diagnostic techniques including various PCR, and rese-
quencing microarray technologies at Naval Research La-
boratory (NRL) located in Washington, DC. A follow up
training was conducted in Bo by NRL personnel.
Personnel from MHRL also obtained scanner mainten-
ance and calibration training from Affymetrix to ensure
proper functioning of the scanner since this was the
most delicate instrument of the system and needed to be
periodically recalibrated. The proficiency of trained
personnel was successfully demonstrated by conducting
the investigation of an outbreak at the poultry farm that
is described below. In addition to initial training, the
NRL personnel were remotely supporting MHRL scien-
tists taking advantage of the Internet connected com-
puter network and Skype based videoconferencing.
Stabilization of field samples and molecular biology
reagents
While the stable power and use of freezers and refrigera-
tors with battery backup solved the problem of storingperishable reagents and samples in the laboratory, it did
not address the issues related to preservation samples
collected in the field. Transport of temperature sensitive
reagents needed for diagnostic procedures was also a
significant problem due to unavailability of commercial
“dry-ice” refrigerated transport service in Sierra Leone.
To overcome these difficulties we explored applicability
of two technologies: FTA paper for field sample collec-
tion and transport as well as stabilization of molecular
biology reagents by freeze drying or related techniques.
FTA paper
FTA paper is a well-established technology for ambient
temperature preservation of nucleic acids and was
designed to protect nucleic acids of the stored sample
from degradation caused by nucleases, oxidation, UV
light and other processes [35,36]. FTA paper also rapidly
inactivates pathogens making the infectious samples
safer to handle by untrained personnel [35-37]. While it
was shown that FTA cards are able to adequately store
DNA samples at room temperature for at least 17 years
without significant degradation [38,39], only limited data
is available on the stability of RNA on FTA paper, espe-
cially when stored at elevated temperatures [28,35,40]. A
series of experiments was conducted to find out if FTA
technology might be suitable for short-term preservation
of samples containing RNA viruses at high ambient tem-
peratures characteristic for a tropical country such as Si-
erra Leone. Influenza B was used as a model organism
for testing. Three different concentrations of influenza B
RNA were spotted on FTA Minicards and stored at vari-
ous temperature conditions for 1–10 days. The higher
concentration of RNA (106 and 104 copies/μl) was con-
sistently detectable after 10 days even when incubated at
the highest tested temperatures (Table 3 and Additional
file 1: Figures S1-S3). Although the lower concentration
of RNA (102 copies/μl) was not detectable in more than
half of the analyzed samples, the lack of detection did
not seem to correlate with storage conditions. These
results indicated that in addition to the established cap-
ability to maintain stable DNA, the FTA cards could also
be used to collect and store RNA samples for a time
frame sufficient to transport and test samples. Inconsist-
ent results of recovery of low concentrations of influenza
B from FTA paper most likely reflected the phenomenon
of dilution of samples deposited on FTA or inefficient
recovery rather than degradation of the RNA.
Reagent stabilization
In an effort to overcome the problems with the delivery
of temperature sensitive reagents to Sierra Leone, we
made an attempt to design molecular diagnostic proto-
cols taking advantage of ambient temperature stabilized
reagents. Commercially available stabilized reagents were
Table 3 Efficiency of detection of Influenza B RNA stored on FTA paper incubated at elevated temperatures1
Influenza B
RNA
concentration
(copies/
microliter)
Duration of incubation (hours) Incubation
temperatures
(°C)
24 72 240
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
106 + + + + + + + + + 20-25 (RT)
+ + + + + + + + + 30
+ + + + + + + + + 30-45 (outdoors)
104 + + + + + + + + + 20-25 (RT)
+ + + F + + + + + 30
+ + + + + + + + + 30-45 (outdoors)
102 − − − + + F − F F 20-25 (RT)
− − − F F − − − − 30
F F F − F F − − − 30-45 (outdoors)
106 (control RNA) + + + −20 (freezer)
102 (control RNA) + + + −20 (freezer)
1Each experiment for particular combination of sample concentration and temperature was run in triplicate. Plus sign indicates that RT-PCR detection produced
strong band of expected size that was observed on a gel; F indicates a faint band and a minus sign indicates absence of an amplification product detectable by
visual inspection on a gel.
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together with modified protocols optimized for use with
these regents. However in case of RPM platform, the sta-
bilized reagents were developed in-house since there
were no commercially stabilized reagents available.
These reagents were developed by adaptation of previ-
ously published methods [41-43]. Details of the proto-
cols, commercial reagents tested and custom reagent
composition and stabilization procedures are described
in supplementary data (Additional file 2).
While these ambient-temperature-stabilized reagent
sets were very stable in high ambient temperatures, the
testing results showed that diagnostic assays using these
reagents were significantly less sensitive than traditional
reagents (data not shown). Due to financial and time
constraints, optimization of the stabilized reagents was
not pursued. While the stabilized reagents were not used
for the subsequent epidemiological investigation, the re-
agent stabilization technology has a great potential to
make the molecular diagnostics more accessible in
developing countries by eliminating the cold chain,
greatly lowering power requirements that are dominated
by refrigeration equipment and making the diagnostic
protocols significantly less complex and error prone [41-
43] and should be further explored in future.
As an alternative, reagents were transported as carry-
on “dry ice” package in accordance with all airline regu-
lations. The packages were prepared with sufficient
amount of dry ice for 48 hours and passed through x-ray
examination. Testing conducted with these reagents
showed no noticeable difference in performance. Since
US based personnel overseeing Mercy Hospital travelregularly (every 1–2 months) to the site, it was possible
to ship reagents to maintain operation of the molecular
diagnostics laboratory for sustained periods of time.
Poultry outbreak investigation
To test the operational capabilities of MHRL molecular
diagnostics laboratory broad-range microbial detection
assays were used to investigate an outbreak that oc-
curred at one of the few commercial poultry farms
located in Bo. The concern was that the outbreak might
have been caused by a highly pathogenic influenza virus
which might be potentially transmitted to farm workers
or poultry kept by individual owners. This is a significant
risk especially in developing countries where it is a com-
mon practice to keep chickens in close proximity to the
household and potentially expose the whole families to
the poultry pathogens.
Two different assays, RPM-Flu and RPM-TEI, were
used to analyze the outbreak samples. The analysis strat-
egy relied on using microarray based broad-range detec-
tion assay to analyze just a small percentage of collected
samples and follow up using single specific PCR based
assays for larger numbers of samples based on the
results of microarray analysis. Therefore only 15 ran-
domly selected samples (see methods for selection
process details) out of a total of 40 pharyngeal swab
samples collected in the farm located in Bo and pre-
served on FTA paper were tested using resequencing
assays. For comparison, 15 additional samples were
selected from 5 other farms located in the Freetown area
which housed mostly healthy chickens were also ana-
lyzed using the same microarrays. The results of RPM
Table 4 Results of pathogen detection using RPM-Flu 3.1
microarray
Farm Sample Most likely ID*
1 B1 K. pneumoniae, P. stutzeri
B2 K. pneumoniae, P. stutzeri
B3 K. pneumoniae
B4 no detection
B5 no detection
B11 no detection
B12 K. pneumoniae, P. aeruginosa, Staph. (mecA gene)
B13 K. pneumoniae, Pseudomonas
B14 K. pneumoniae, P. aeruginosa, Staph. (mecA gene)
B15 K. pneumoniae, P. putida, Staph. (mecA gene)
B25 K. pneumoniae, Pseudomonas
B26 K. pneumoniae
B27 K. pneumoniae, P. putida
B28 K. pneumoniae, P. aeruginosa, Staph. (mecA gene)
B35 no detection
2 H2 no detection
H3 no detection
H4 (P. aeruginosa or M. catarrhalis)
6 HA5 (P. aeruginosa or M. catarrhalis)
HA6 no detection
HA7 Pseudomonas
5 A1 no detection
A2 P. putida
A16 no detection
9 J2 P. aeruginosa, E. sakazakii
J7 no detection
J10 no detection
4 W3 K. pneumoniae
W4 P. aeruginosa
W6 (Pseudomonas or Moraxella or Methylobacillus)
*Most likely ID was determined using CIBSI algorithm and based on similarity
analysis of the sequences obtained from the microarray with sequences
deposited GenBank at the time of conducting the analysis (April 2010).
Abbreviations used: K. pneumoniae= Klebsiella pneumoniae, P.
stutzeri = Pseudomonas stutzeri, Staph. = Staphylococcus spp., P.
aeruginosa= Pseudomonas aeruginosa, P. putida= Pseudomonas putida, M.
catarrhalis=Moraxella catarhalis, E. sakazakii = Enterobacter sakazakii. Organism
names enclosed in parentheses denote result of hybridization of a single
microarray tile, which cannot be unambiguously identified based on the
obtained sequence.
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in Table 4 and described below.Bacterial pathogens
While no viral pathogens were detected using RPM assays,
a number of bacterial pathogens including Klebsiellapneumoniae and several Pseudomonas species were found
in analyzed samples.
An assortment of closely related Pseudomonas species
(P. stutzeri, P. aeruginosa, P. putida) or undefined
Pseudomonas was detected in 16 of the 30 analyzed
samples. The ubiquitous presence of Pseudomonas spp.,
a known opportunist organisms colonizing the avian re-
spiratory tract [44], indicated that it played no significant
role in the outbreak. K. pneumoniae on the other hand
was found mostly in the samples from farm in Bo (73%,
12 out of the 15 analyzed samples), while only one sam-
ple from farms outside of Bo was positive for this organ-
ism (7%, Table 4). This result suggested a link between
the outbreak and the presence of K. pneumoniae. Al-
though K. pneumoniae is usually considered an environ-
mental contaminant, it may sporadically cause embryo
mortality, yolk sac infections and mortality in young
chickens, turkeys and ostriches. In addition, the concur-
rent infection of young turkeys with K. pneumoniae is
known to increase the severity of respiratory disease
caused by other pathogens [44]. The presence of K.
pneumoniae in the majority of outbreak samples sug-
gested that it is an opportunist pathogen colonizing/
coinfecting sick chickens and increasing the severity of
infection caused by another (unidentified) pathogen.
This notion was also supported by the fact that higher
percentages of outbreak samples were testing positive
for more than one pathogen simultaneously (60% vs. 6%
of healthy samples).
In addition to previously mentioned bacteria, the
RPM-Flu microarray also detected mecA (methicillin re-
sistance) gene in four samples collected from the farm in
Bo. The mecA gene is responsible for staphylococcal re-
sistance to a broad range of β-lactam antibiotics [45].
While mecA carrying bacteria in chickens were reported
before [46], it is unknown if the staphylococci carrying
this gene were acquired by poultry from humans or the
spread of this resistance mechanism was purely zoo-
notic. Nonetheless, the prevalence of mecA gene (at least
10% of analyzed samples collected in Bo) in the
staphylococci colonizing/infecting the analyzed popula-
tion of chickens is a cause of concern due to a potential
of spread to humans and warrants further study.
Influenza virus
Lack of positive detection of influenza in all samples
tested with RPM-Flu assay indicated that it is unlikely
that the outbreak was caused by any known strain of in-
fluenza virus as it was initially suspected. To independ-
ently confirm the RPM-Flu assay and expand the results
of influenza A detection, all 136 collected samples were
analyzed using a published real-time RT-PCR assay [34].
This assay, amplifying a conserved segment of influenza
matrix gene to detect influenza A regardless of serotype,
Leski et al. Health Research Policy and Systems 2012, 10:22 Page 9 of 10
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the analyzed samples (data not shown).
Based on the obtained results, it was impossible to
exclude the possibility that the outbreak was caused
by one of the major poultry respiratory pathogens
(such as avian paramyxovirus type 2 [47] or avian
metapneumovirus [48]) that are not represented on
the RPM-Flu microarray, since this assay was targeted
for detection of human pathogens.
Although, the conclusive determination of the cause of
the outbreak and the roles of particular identified patho-
gens was not possible based on the available data, the out-
break investigation demonstrated potential usefulness of
the broad-range microbial detection technology in future
investigations. The recent emergence and spread of highly
pathogenic avian influenza strains has raised concern
about outbreaks in poultry farms. As a result, the local
health authorities usually treat poultry farm outbreaks as a
potential deadly threat to humans, and order all the birds
in the affected farms to be culled as a precaution. This
practice results in a very significant economic burden to
farm owners in developing countries and it may be avoid-
able. In this study, the delay of completion of the molecu-
lar analysis (approx. 11 months) caused by problems
associated with logistics of reagent delivery did not enable
us to prevent the slaughtering of the flock, however, the
study indicated that application of broad–spectrum mi-
crobial diagnostics might make it possible in future out-
breaks. While cost of conducting a single RPM assay
(approx. $100-200) is too high for routine diagnostics in
resource-limited settings, the technology may be a cost ef-
fective way for national surveillance of avian influenza and
other important human pathogens. The power of a single
set of RPM assays allows detection of a panel of pathogens
that would otherwise require a full national reference la-
boratory infrastructure, which would costs millions of
USD. In the case of this project the total cost of setting up
the laboratory to run RPM based assays was approxi-
mately $250 thousand, including the building for labora-
tory set up, power equipment, scientific instruments,
telecommunication infrastructure and training.Conclusions
The project has shown that successful deployment and
application of an advanced diagnostic technology in the
conditions of low-resource tropical country is feasible.
One of the most important outcomes of this effort was
identification of a set of technologies that are needed to
achieve this goal in an extremely challenging environ-
ment. Laying this groundwork will help us and others to
build infectious pathogen diagnostic capacity in develop-
ing world in an efficient way by taking advantage of
technological “leapfrogging”.Additional files
Additional file 1: Supplementary Data Figures.
Additional file 2: Supplementary Data [30,31,34,49].
Competing interests
APM, BL and DAS are inventors of four US patents, and one pending patent
application that are related to RPM technologies. These authors also receive
royalty payment from Tessarae LLC (Potomac Fall, VA, USA), which licenses
the RPM technologies for commercial purposes.
Acknowledgements
We would like to acknowledge the help of Maurice Jefferson for designing
and constructing protective shipping encasements for laboratory hardware
and loading ramp for offloading shipped containers and Ted Clarke for
drawing the Campus network diagram.
The funding for this project was provided by the Office of Naval Research
(SwampWorks), the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (Coalition Warfare Program) and the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The opinions and assertions contained
herein are those of the authors and none are to be construed as those of
the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of the Navy, any other
military service, or government agency at large.
Author details
1Center for Bio/Molecular Science and Engineering, Naval Research
Laboratory, Washington DC 20375, USA. 2Mercy Hospital Research
Laboratory, Kulanda Town, Bo, Sierra Leone. 3Liverpool School of Tropical
Medicine, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK. 4Institute of Environmental
Management and Quality Control, Njala University, Njala, Sierra Leone.
5Chemistry Department, Njala University, Njala, Sierra Leone. 6National
Research Council (NRC) Associate, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington
DC 20375, USA. 7Nova Research Incorporated, Alexandria, VA 22308, USA.
8Biology Department of School of Environmental Sciences, Njala University,
Njala, Sierra Leone.
Authors’ contributions
RA and TAL were involved in study conception, data collection, and drafting
of the manuscript. APM was involved in the study conception, data analysis,
and critical manuscript revision. ASB and AJS were involved in GIS data
collection and manuscript revision. DHJ and UB were involved in poultry
sample collection, molecular analyses and manuscript revision. BRB was
involved in FTA card testing, and drafting part of the manuscript. MA was
involved in poultry sample collection, and manuscript revision. BMK was
involved in study conception and manuscript revision. NCL, BL and TAL were
involved in MHRL personnel training. BL was involved study conception, data
analysis and critical manuscript revision. DAS was involved in study
conception and manuscript revision. All authors have read and approved of
the final manuscript.
Received: 26 October 2011 Accepted: 4 July 2012
Published: 4 July 2012
References
1. Kebede S, Duales S, Yokouide A, Alemu W: Trends of major disease
outbreaks in the African region, 2003–2007. East Afr J Public Health 2010,
7(1):20–29.
2. Bausch DG, Demby AH, Coulibaly M, Kanu J, Goba A, Bah A, Conde N,
Wurtzel HL, Cavallaro KF, Lloyd E, et al: Lassa fever in Guinea:I.
Epidemiology of human disease and clinical observations. Vector Borne
Zoonotic Dis 2001, 1(4):269–281.
3. Williams BG, Gouws E, Boschi-Pinto C, Bryce J, Dye C: Estimates of world-
wide distribution of child deaths from acute respiratory infections.
Lancet Infect Dis 2002, 2(1):25–32.
4. Merianos A: Surveillance and Response to Disease Emergence. In Wildlife
and Emerging Zoonotic Diseases: The Biology, Circumstances and
Consequences of Cross-Species Transmission. Volume 315, edn. Edited by
Childs JE, Mackenzie JS, Richt JA. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer; 2007:477–509.
5. Ozer N: Emerging vector-borne diseases in a changing environment. Turk
J Biol 2005, 29:125–135.
Leski et al. Health Research Policy and Systems 2012, 10:22 Page 10 of 10
http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/10/1/226. Meng XJ: Hepatitis E virus: animal reservoirs and zoonotic risk. Vet
Microbiol 2010, 140(3–4):256–265.
7. Fichet-Calvet E, Lecompte E, Koivogui L, Soropogui B, Dore A, Kourouma F,
Sylla O, Daffis S, Koulemou K, Ter Meulen J: Fluctuation of abundance and
Lassa virus prevalence in Mastomys natalensis in Guinea, West Africa.
Vector Borne Zoonotic Dis 2007, 7(2):119–128.
8. Chomel BB, Sun B: Zoonoses in the bedroom. Emerg Infect Dis 2011,
17(2):167–172.
9. Maudlin I, Eisler MC, Welburn SC: Neglected and endemic zoonoses. Philos
Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2009, 364(1530):2777–2787.
10. Tatem AJ, Rogers DJ, Hay SI: Global Transport Networks and Infectious
Disease Spread. In Global Mapping of Infectious Diseases Methods, Examples
and Emerging Applications. Edited by Simon I, Hay AG, David JR. New York:
Academic; 2006:293–343. Rollinson D, Hay SI(Series Editors):: Advances in
Parasitology, vol 62.
11. Reiter P: The standardised freight container: vector of vectors and vector-
borne diseases. Rev Sci Tech 2010, 29(1):57–64.
12. Webster CH: Airline operating realities and the global spread of
infectious diseases. Asia-Pacific journal of public health/Asia-Pacific Academic
Consortium for Public Health 2010, 22(3 Suppl):137S–143S.
13. Lines J: Chikungunya in Italy. BMJ 2007, 335(7620):576.
14. Tatem AJ, Rogers DJ, Hay SI: Estimating the malaria risk of African
mosquito movement by air travel. Malar J 2006, 5:57.
15. Karesh WB, Cook RA, Bennett EL, Newcomb J: Wildlife trade and global
disease emergence. Emerg Infect Dis 2005, 11(7):1000–1002.
16. Bates I, Maitland K: Are laboratory services coming of age in sub-Saharan
Africa? Clin Infect Dis 2006, 42(3):383–384.
17. Nkengasong JN, Nsubuga P, Nwanyanwu O, Gershy-Damet GM, Roscigno G,
Bulterys M, Schoub B, DeCock KM, Birx D: Laboratory systems and services
are critical in global health: time to end the neglect? Am J Clin Pathol
2010, 134(3):368–373.
18. FluTrackers.com: Uganda: Hemorrhagic fever outbreak- Yellow Fever., .
http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/showthread.php?t=155125.
19. World Health Organization: Yellow fever in Uganda.: ; http://www.who.int/
csr/don/2011_01_19/en/index.html.
20. Ansumana R, Malanoski AP, Bockarie AS, Sundufu AJ, Jimmy DH, Bangura U,
Jacobsen KH, Lin B, Stenger DA: Enabling methods for community health
mapping in developing countries. Int J Health Geogr 2010, 9:56.
21. Anthony RM, Brown TJ, French GL: Rapid diagnosis of bacteremia by
universal amplification of 23 S ribosomal DNA followed by hybridization
to an oligonucleotide array. J Clin Microbiol 2000, 38(2):781–788.
22. Goldemberg J: Leapfrog energy technologies. Energy Policy 1998,
26(10):729–741.
23. Watson J, Sauter R: Sustainable innovation through leapfrogging: a
review of the evidence. International Journal of Technology and
Globalisation 2011, 5(3–4):170–189.
24. Kwankam SY, Ningo NN: Information Technology in Africa: A Proactive
Approach and the Prospects of Leapfrogging Decades in the
Development Process. In Inet97. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Internet Society;
1997.
25. Jacobus HS, Lin B, Jimmy DH, Ansumana R, Malanoski AP, Stenger DA:
Evaluating the impact of adding energy storage on the performance
of a hybrid power system. Energy Conversion and Management 2011,
52(7):2604–2610.
26. Jacobus HS: Solar-Diesel Hybrid Power System Optimization and
Experimental Validation. In MS thesis.: University of Maryland; 2010.
27. Burgoyne LA: Solid medium and method for DNA storage. In Edited by
USPTO, vol. 5496562. USA: Flinders Technologies Pty Ltd; 1996.
28. Rogers CD, Burgoyne LA: Reverse transcription of an RNA genome
from databasing paper (FTA(R)). Biotechnology and Applied Biochemistry
2000, 31(Pt 3):219–224.
29. Lin B, Malanoski AP, Wang Z, Blaney KM, Long NC, Meador CE, Metzgar
D, MC A, YS L, MM R, et al: Universal detection and Identification of
avian Influenza using resequencing microarrays. J Clin Microbiol 2009,
47(4):988–993.
30. Leski TA, Lin B, Malanoski AP, Wang Z, Long NC, Meador CE, Barrows B,
Ibrahim S, Hardick JP, Aitichou M, et al: Testing and validation of high
density resequencing microarray for broad range biothreat agents
detection. PLoS ONE 2009, 4(8):e6569.31. Lin B, Blaney KM, Malanoski AP, Ligler AG, Schnur JM, Metzgar D, Russell KL,
Stenger DA: Using a resequencing microarray as a multiple respiratory
pathogen detection assay. J Clin Microbiol 2007, 45(2):443–452.
32. Wang Z, Malanoski AP, Lin B, Kidd C, Long NC, Blaney KM, Thach DC,
Tibbetts C, Stenger DA: Resequencing microarray probe design for typing
genetically diverse viruses: human rhinoviruses and enteroviruses. BMC
genomics 2008, 9(1):577.
33. Malanoski AP, Lin B, Wang Z, Schnur JM, Stenger DA: Automated
identification of multiple micro-organisms from resequencing DNA
microarrays. Nucleic Acids Res 2006, 34(18):5300–5311.
34. Carr MJ, Gunson R, Maclean A, Coughlan S, Fitzgerald M, Scully M, O'Herlihy
B, Ryan J, O'Flanagan D, Connell J, et al: Development of a real-time RT-
PCR for the detection of swine-lineage influenza A (H1N1) virus
infections. J Clin Virol 2009, 45(3):196–199.
35. Whatman: Whatman FTA for Total RNA. Whatman 2004, 51643:1–2.
36. Whatman: Whatman FTA DNA protection. Whatman 2006, 51677:1–2.
37. Abdelwhab EM, Luschow D, Harder TC, Hafez HM: The use of FTA((R))
filter papers for diagnosis of avian influenza virus. J Virol Methods
2011, 174(1–2):120–122.
38. Smith LM, Burgoyne LA: Collecting, archiving and processing DNA from
wildlife samples using FTA databasing paper. BMC ecology 2004, 4:4.
39. Whatman: FTA Nucleic Acid Collection, Storage and Purification.: ; http://www.
whatman.com/FTANucleicAcidCollectionStorageandPurification.aspx.
40. Natarajan P, Trinh T, Mertz L, Goldsborough M, Fox DK: Paper-based
archiving of mammalian and plant samples for RNA analysis.
Biotechniques 2000, 29(6):1328–1333.
41. Chua AL, Elina HT, Lim BH, Yean CY, Ravichandran M, Lalitha P:
Development of a dry reagent-based triplex PCR for the detection
of toxigenic and non-toxigenic Vibrio cholerae. J Med Microbiol 2011,
60(Pt 4):481–485.
42. Klatser PR, Kuijper S, van Ingen CW, Kolk AH: Stabilized, freeze-dried PCR
mix for detection of mycobacteria. J Clin Microbiol 1998, 36(6):1798–1800.
43. Aziah I, Ravichandran M, Ismail A: Amplification of ST50 gene using dry-
reagent-based polymerase chain reaction for the detection of
Salmonella typhi. Diagn Microbiol Infect Dis 2007, 59(4):373–377.
44. Barnes HJ: Miscellaneous and sporadic bacterial infections. In Diseases of
poultry. 11th edition. Edited by Saif YM. Ames: Blackwell Publishing
Company; 2003:845–862.
45. Berger-Bachi B: Genetic basis of methicillin resistance in Staphylococcus
aureus. Cellular and Molecular Life Sciences 1999, 56(9–10):764–770.
46. Kawano J, Shimizu A, Saitoh Y, Yagi M, Saito T, Okamoto R: Isolation of
methicillin-resistant coagulase-negative staphylococci from chickens. J
Clin Microbiol 1996, 34(9):2072–2077.
47. Alexander DJ: Avian Paramyxoviruses 2–9. In Diseases of poultry. 11th
edition. Edited by Saif YM. Ames: Blackwell Publishing Company;
2003:88–92.
48. Gough RE: Avian Pneumoviruses. In Diseases of poultry. 11th edition. Edited
by Saif YM. Ames: Blackwell Publishing Company; 2003:92–100.
49. Colaco C, et al: Extraordinary stability of enzymes dried in trehalose:
simplified molecular biology. Biotechnology (N Y) 1992, 10(9):1007–1011.
doi:10.1186/1478-4505-10-22
Cite this article as: Leski et al.: Leapfrog diagnostics: Demonstration of a
broad spectrum pathogen identification platform in a resource-limited
setting. Health Research Policy and Systems 2012 10:22.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
